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Conrad P. Voldstad*
Good morning ladies and gentlemen. I am delighted to be the
keynote speaker at this symposium on the regulation of OTC
derivatives. As many of you know, I retired as CEO of the International
Swaps and Derivatives Association (“ISDA”) at the end of 2011. While
I remain an advisor to ISDA and its Board, my remarks today will
strictly be my own. I take full responsibility for my opinions and hope
they give one and all pause for thought and discussion as we proceed
through the symposium.
While I am a graduate of Fordham Law School, I have never
practiced law. My background has been in management, trading and
underwriting, and analysis. As you know from the introduction, I was
the first Global Head of JP Morgan’s Derivatives Group, the head of
Global Markets at Merrill Lynch, founder of the first AAA-rated swap
company, one of a team that liquidated Long Term Capital Management
in 1998 and 1999, and a manager of my own hedge fund for a number of
years. I also had a valuable stint on the board of a credit reinsurance
company. I should also mention I spent several years at JP Morgan as a
lending officer to large companies and banks in the United States.
These were all important experiences.
Today, I will talk about facts and numbers as well as the common
sense needs for regulatory reform. I will suggest that we may be
heading for some regulatory overkill just as we may be seeing the same
with respect to bank capital requirements. I will start my remarks by
† This transcript of Mr. Voldstad's opening remarks was edited to remove minor
cadences of speech that appear awkward in writing and to provide sources and
references to other explanatory materials where the editors deemed appropriate.
* Mr. Voldstad was Chief Executive Officer and Executive Director of International
Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc. from November 30, 2009 until December 31,
2011. Prior to his time at ISDA, Mr. Voldstad managed his own debt and currency
hedge fund until 2007. Before that, he occupied several senior roles at Merrill Lynch,
including Co-Head of Global Debt Markets, as well as at J.P. Morgan, where he served
as the first head of their Global Swaps Group until 1987. Mr. Voldstad holds a J.D.
from Fordham University, an M.B.A from the Amos Tuck School of Business at
Dartmouth College, and a B.A. from Boston College.
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discussing the role of OTC derivatives in the financial crisis. Then I’ll
comment on counterparty losses sustained by the U.S. banking system
on OTC derivatives. Some of what I say may surprise you. In my next
topic, I will discuss the present marketplace, and how much has been
accomplished to make the markets safer and more efficient—to use
ISDA’s new tag line. I think some of this will also surprise you. Then I
will look at overkill—how proposed regulations create enormous costs
with very little benefit. I will offer alternatives as well. But please
remember these opinions are my own.
I. OTC DERIVATIVES IN THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
Shortly after my arrival at ISDA, I published an Op-Ed in the
Financial Times. In that piece, I argued that the main cause of the
financial crisis was the US residential and commercial mortgage
markets, and bad lending and underwriting decisions and practices.1 I
did not go into why this happened. We have all read explanations, and I
believe blame was widespread: regulators and policymakers made
terrible mistakes; Government-sponsored enterprises (“GSEs”) had
conflicted business models; mortgage bankers were unscrupulous in
originating mortgages; rating agencies developed horrid rating
practices; securities dealers structured complex mortgage products
around the rating agency criteria and then actually decided they could
hold them on their balance sheets once AIG Financial Products (“AIG
FP”) closed for business. An entire insurance industry class disappeared
as they insured these toxic securities, some at the beckoning of dealers
who realized that their holdings were plummeting in value, and some at
the request of investors who wished to bet against mortgages. I then
listed many of the dozens of companies that had ceased to exist due to
one underlying cause: tremendous losses on real estate exposure.2 Some
of the exposure was taken in derivative form but a good deal of this was
meant to insure dealers that already had taken the risk.
In September 2008, Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy.3 Panic
unfolded when money market funds broke the buck.4 These funds had
1. Conrad Voldstad, Op-Ed., We Have Yet to Address the Cause of the Financial
Crises, FINANCIAL TIMES, Jul. 6, 2010, available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/
88b39646-890e-11df-8925-00144feab49a.html#axzz2AMckCygD.
2. Id.
3. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Lehman Brothers Files for Bankruptcy; Merrill is
Sold, NY TIMES, Sept. 14, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/15/business/
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invested in cash securities issued by Lehman Brothers. At least we have
not heard pundits say that derivatives caused the money fund problems.
Lehman’s derivatives portfolio was duly unwound. Much interdealer
exposure was unwound at SwapClear, where $8 trillion was moved at a
cost of around $200 million, all covered by initial margin. Dealers and
other counterparties unwound positions in due course and submitted
claims in bankruptcy.
Interestingly, we examined the derivatives related claims on
Lehman’s estate by non-financial corporations and found only five
instances where claims exceeded $25 million. (We excluded a $300
million claim by the New York Giants, which had issued auction-market
securities that unraveled earlier in 2008 because of the deterioration of
its insurance company guarantor.) Our analysis showed the losses from
derivatives hardly put the system at risk. They were not helpful, of
course, but they were manageable.
Furthermore, the credit default swap (“CDS”) market for Lehman
as a reference entity functioned properly. There was, to be sure, some
anxiety in the market until the net CDS exposure on Lehman was
disclosed. It was only about $5.5 billion. Offsetting trades were
matched and the high collateralization of CDS meant that no
counterparty failed to meet its obligations.
Very shortly after Lehman, the New York Fed bailed out AIG.
AIG FP had guaranteed, in CDS form, approximately $60 billion of
subprime collateralized debt obligations (“CDOs”) through the end of
2005. Unlike most financial firms, AIG FP generally did not have to
post variation margin on its derivatives unless it was downgraded below
AA. When the downgrade occurred, AIG had a monstrous margin call.
But the margin calls were not confined to CDS. AIG also held a $50
billion plus portfolio of subprime mortgages for its bond lending
business. Borrowers of these securities would not post 100% cash
collateral when the securities were worth fractions of that amount.
Instead, AIG had to come up with the difference. That is why there
were two special purpose vehicles (“SPVs”) set up by the New York
Fed. Maiden Lane II contained the subprime mortgages from the bond

15lehman.html.
4. Christopher Condon, Reserve Primary Fund Falls Below $1 a Share,
BLOOMBERG, Sept. 16, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
newsarchive&sid=aycQDd9pEdCA&refer=home.
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lending operation, 5 while Maiden Lane III eventually purchased the
underlying bonds covered by the CDS.6 There were no losses sustained
by AIG FP’s counterparties as a result of the New York Fed’s actions.
Interestingly, sources at AIG indicated that, as of last fall, no cash losses
would have been sustained to date on the CDS had they remained in
place.
As I mentioned earlier, I spent a few years on the Board of a credit
reinsurer during the period that spanned the financial crisis. This gave
me a great perspective on what happened in the mortgage market. With
AIG FP out of business, the primary credit insurers, called monolines,
rushed to take AIG FP’s place. Some of this credit protection was
structured for investors betting against mortgages. Far more was
structured to make the underlying bonds easier to sell or to protect
positions held by dealers.
I can only say I was shocked by what I saw. The entire industry
has been virtually wiped out and dealer losses on exposures to
monolines were staggering. ISDA did a paper last year and found
provisions for losses among a dozen dealers were in excess of $50
billion with respect to monoline risk.7 A good deal of these provisions
was taken by foreign firms or US non-bank entities. The US banking
system was not badly hurt at all. The losses attributed to the monolines’
derivatives exposure were the largest single negative of OTC derivatives
in the financial crisis. These exposures were not collateralized, similar
to the practice relating to AIG FP. I thought you would all be pleased to
learn that derivatives with monolines have been excluded from DoddFrank. So much for getting the legislation right.
II. OCC REPORTS
Each quarter, the Office of the Controller of the Currency (“OCC”)
produces a report on the derivatives activity of US banks. We have
found the report to be very helpful. It outlines gross and net credit

5. See Maiden Lane Transactions, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK,
http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/maidenlane.html.
6. See id.
7. Counterparty Credit Risk Management in the US Over-the-Counter (OTC)
Derivatives Markets, Part II: A Review of Monoline Exposures, ISDA, 1 (Nov. 8,
2011), http://www2.isda.org/attachment/MzcyMQ==/Counterparty%20Credit% 20Risk
%20II%20(Monolines).pdf.
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exposure and the use of collateral. It also contains useful data with
respect to US bank participation in the market.
From the beginning of 2007 through the third quarter of 2011,
charge-offs related to OTC derivatives amounted to $4.345 billion. This
includes $1.6 billion last year on a single monoline by one bank. It also
includes nearly $850 million in the fourth quarter of 2008, which was
presumably related to Lehman. Excluding those two amounts, chargeoffs totaled only $1.9 billion, hardly a significant amount. The OCC
report each quarter explains that the credit quality of participants in the
OTC derivatives market is superior to Commercial and Industrial
(“C&I”) borrowers. Credit risk is also mitigated by netting of exposures
and significant use of collateral. I need to repeat my comment with
respect to monoline exposure, however. Very little of this was booked
in commercial banks.
III. WHAT IS NEEDED?
If one reflects on what happened, it is not difficult to summarize
what went wrong, and what is needed. First, bank supervisors did not
know the risks that regulated banks were taking on. Neither they nor the
banks appreciated the risks of their real estate and mortgage portfolios.
Nor did they have ready information on the derivatives risk of their
regulated banks. Granted, they had the ability to inspect the banks and
many regulators had staff permanently residing at the banks. But they
did not feel they knew what market risks were present and what entities
were accumulating risk.
Second, the industry allowed large amounts of risk to go uncollateralized. I am speaking now of AIG FP and the monolines as
examples. (But I know of no other examples.) Whether this would have
prevented the losses from occurring is unknown. The insurance
companies would not have dreamed the value of their policies could
require the collateral that would be needed. If the CDS would not have
been written had collateral been required, much of the risk would have
remained in cash form on dealers’ books.
Finally, regulators had to be sure there could be an orderly
liquidation of positions in the bankruptcy of a major participant.
IV. WHAT HAS HAPPENED?
In my opinion, there has been tremendous progress even in the
absence of final regulations. Much of this progress was initiated back in
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2005 when the New York Fed assembled a group of global regulators
and the largest dealers to set commitments on improving the safety and
infrastructure of the market.8 Derivative confirmations are now largely
transmitted electronically. CDS terms have been standardized, enabling
trades to be torn up. A credit event determination and auction process
has been established and is working very well.
Clearing has risen dramatically among the top thirty-five or so
dealers. Today, over $300 trillion of Interest Rate Swaps (“IRSs”) are
being cleared. Clearing is also catching on in the CDS marketplace.
There, over 75% of the market has been torn up in compression runs
(some $82 trillion to date) or has been cleared. Compression in the IRS
market has totaled a staggering $164 trillion through year-end 2011.9
Dealers are getting much better at compression of both IRS and CDS
products and more progress is coming.10
Through ISDA, trade repositories are in place for credit and rates
products, and commodities and equity derivatives are in the works.
ISDA has also proposed building a counterparty credit repository that
will contain the value of each counterparty’s derivatives as well as the
collateral that supports it.
There has been much talk about the riskiness of the CDS market,
and I thought it would be useful to go through the metrics and risk
practices of the product. First, market data has been available through
the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (“DTCC”) and its
website.11 As of year-end 2011, DTCC reported some $25.9 trillion of
notional outstanding CDS,12 with non-dealers making up $4.5 trillion.
Actual open positions total only $2.7 trillion. 13 The other important
point to understand with respect to CDS is the very high level of
collateralization. ISDA’s last margin survey indicated large dealers
8. See OTC Derivatives Supervisors Group, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW
YORK, http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/otc_derivatives_supervisors_group.html.
9. Interest Rate Swap Compression: A Progress Report, ISDA, 1 (Feb. 2012),
http://www2.isda.org/functional-areas/research/studies/.
10. See id. at 9 (discussing the progress dealers have made in IRS compression and
CDS progress).
11. THE DEPOSITORY TRUST & CLEARING CORPORATION (Jan. 24, 2013),
http://www.dtcc.com/.
12. See OTC Derivatives Market Analysis: Year-end 2011, ISDA.ORG, 7 (June
2012), https://www2.isda.org/attachment/NDQzNQ==/Market%20Analysis%
20060612.pdf.
13. Id.
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required over 95% of their counterparties to post collateral. Clearing
results from the BIS show $5.5 trillion of cleared CDS but this does not
include the compression I noted a few moments ago of $82 trillion. The
most recent figures for net open positions on Greece showed total
exposures of just over $3 billion.
V. OVERKILL?
As I get into my final topic, I’ll remind the audience once again that
I am speaking as a private citizen. I’ll also remind the audience I
believe in what I say.
First, let’s look at clearing. It looks like a panacea, but is it?
Clearing breaks down netting sets and displaces exposures. Now, a
client dealer relationship will net IRS against CDS, equity derivatives,
and commodity derivatives. It is possible to net an entire derivative
relationship. What might happen with clearing? In individual asset
classes, some positions will be cleared and subject to margin
requirements. In the same asset class, other positions will be executed
bilaterally and will require margin as well. Many products that can be
cleared are actually executed because they are hedges for products not
eligible for clearing such as swaptions. In this way, clearing may double
up the need for collateral. This problem is multiplied because there will
be separate clearing houses for each product. Furthermore, the number
of clearinghouses per asset class is forecast to be large, as many
countries will require transactions in their markets to be cleared in a
local clearinghouse.
Cleared and non-cleared trades will also be subject to initial margin
requirements.14 This is a troubling requirement as estimates of initial
margin run in the trillions. If we assume the cost of the margin is 1%,
this amounts to $10 billion per trillion per year. Does anyone believe
that this is the right price to pay for this protection? We are not talking
about variation margin. How much could have possibly been saved with
initial margin? I think the amount is probably in the tens of millions
globally per annum. Can not a clearinghouse or other entity provide the
same protection more efficiently? I suggested several months ago that
variation margin is the critical collateral required for safety. Suppose
each dealer were to use an entity licensed by regulators to collect
14. See Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major
Swap Participants, 76 Fed. Reg. 23732 (proposed Apr. 28, 2011) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pt. 23).
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variation margin collateral across all derivative products on a netted
basis. We would retain the benefits of netting and capture the main
benefits of clearing. The same licensed entity could organize the
liquidation of dealer portfolios in a dealer bankruptcy, perhaps by
collecting some margin from the dealer. Surely, the savings to the
system would amount to hundreds of billions, if not trillions, of dollars
of margin.
I have not mentioned the systemic risk that might arise out of
clearinghouses and I cannot blame regulators entirely for forcing an oldfashioned remedy on the derivatives market. It is up to the industry to
design a better mousetrap. It will be up to regulators to analyze the
mousetrap to ensure it is strong and flexible. We do not have to
eliminate losses on derivatives, but rather ensure any losses are modest.
My second example of overkill is the mandate for executing certain
transactions on electronic platforms called swap execution facilities.
This, of course, is not designed to reduce systemic risk in the
marketplace. It is a change of structure that demands a cost-benefit
analysis that can justify the mandate. Such an analysis has not been
done by any government agency. We performed such an analysis at
ISDA for the IRS market. We found that participants expected to get
worse pricing as a result of the mandate, and the infrastructure cost in
the US alone would be in excess of $200 million per year with much
larger upfront costs. We also showed there would be meaningless
benefits at best to small users. Policymakers are jamming the futures
industry infrastructure on entirely different markets. In my judgment,
this provision is not needed at all and I welcome any member of the
audience to justify its existence.
I will make one other observation about reform: It is needed, but it
needs to be done carefully and analytically. We have not seen this. As I
said, many parties were to blame for the financial crisis. Regulation
enabled banks to set aside no capital for many sovereigns and to lever
$1 of common equity over 700 times through investments in CDOs.
They need to listen as well as prescribe regulations.
I would like to end my remarks with a story. It is a story about
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. It seems the famed jurist was getting
on in years, and one day was taking a train trip. The conductor
approached him to ask for his ticket and Holmes fumbled around
looking for it. The conductor recognized Holmes and smiled at him
saying, “Don’t worry Justice Holmes. You can mail the ticket in when
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you find it.” To which Holmes replied, “The problem isn’t where is my
ticket? The problem is where am I going?”
I think in the rush to enact—and to implement—regulatory reform,
we can forget exactly what it is we are trying to do. We focus instead
on the politically expedient, or the little, and not the big picture. That,
of course, is a big mistake and we need to work hard to prevent it.
This concludes my remarks. I hope I have given the panelists food
for thought.

